报告时间：2018年4月24日下午14:00-17:00

报告地点：人文社会高等研究院（团结四楼）三楼会议室

邀请部门：人文社会高等研究院、运营与供应链管理研究所

报告人：武汉大学经济与管理学院   关旭  教授

报告题目：Strategic Inventory and Price Signaling with Demand Information Asymmetry

报告摘要：In a two-period supply chain wherein the supplier dynamically determines the wholesale prices, a retailer can strategically hold inventory to alleviate double marginalization and create a ”win-win” situation for both firms. This strategic use of inventory has been verified by many studies but with a premise that the demand information is observable to both the supplier and the retailer. However, in practice, the retailer is normally less clear about the market potential than the supplier, particularly during a new product introduction process. This paper revisits the implications of strategic inventory in a context where the supplier privately observes the demand information and can use the wholesale price as a signaling tool to convey such information to the retailer.

We show that, first, the retailer might deliberately hold inventory even under commitment contract; in addition, the retailer’s incentive to carry strategic inventory exhibits a non-monotonic relationship between the inventory level and the demand potential under dynamic contract. Second, the supplier’s payoff could decrease with the inventory cost under commitment contract while increase with the inventory cost under dynamic contract, even though there is no inventory existing under either contract scheme. Third, the supplier no longer unambiguously prefers dynamic contract to commitment contract once the inventory cost is low. In contrast, the retailer can obtain a higher payoff under dynamic contract (commitment contract) once the inventory cost is high (low). All these results are in strict contract with the existing literature and highlight the pivotal role of price signaling in the strategic use of inventory.

关旭教授简介：现任武汉大学经济与管理学院管理科学与工程系教授; 华中科技大学管理学博士。目前研究领域为信息不对称环境下的供应链管理。近5年来在Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistic等国际权威学术发表近20篇论文。

 

 

报告人：上海大学管理学院   殷哲  博士

报告题目：Dynamic Management of Opaque Selling When Customers Use Anecdotal Reasoning

报告摘要：Probabilistic or opaque selling, whereby the seller hides the exact identity of the product until after the buyer makes the payment, has been used in practice. The existing literature has largely focused on understanding why opaque selling is attractive to firms. In this paper, we intend to answer a practically important “follow-up” question: How should opaque selling be managed in a firm's daily operations in practice? Answering this question is complex, since (i) the profitability of opaque selling depends on how customers respond to the firm's product offering strategies and (ii) the firm has to dynamically adjust its pricing and product offering decisions to be responsive to customers' purchasing decisions. We develop a dynamic framework to capture the dynamic nature of the problem in two periods when customers boundedly rationally expect the firm's strategies through anecdotal reasoning. We characterize the firm's optimal pricing and product offering policy, and prove that a fixed product offering policy or a dynamic product offering policy may be optimal depending on product features and customers’ samples that are collected for anecdotal reasoning. If more samples are from the historical period, the firm could benefit more from the dynamically adjusting of the product offering probability.

殷哲博士简介：现任上海大学管理学院工商管理系教师; 华中科技大学管理科学与工程专业博士。目前研究领域包括运营营销中的消费者行为、供应链中的供应风险管理。近5年来在Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research等国际权威学术期刊发表8篇论文。

 

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